tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9532013.post110750971950556001..comments2024-03-19T03:32:53.663-04:00Comments on The Confrontation Blog: Opening the DoorRichard D. Friedmanhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/08376534293308240526noreply@blogger.comBlogger7125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9532013.post-25692589802212602212011-07-18T13:48:09.594-04:002011-07-18T13:48:09.594-04:00Have you had a chance to think about your position...Have you had a chance to think about your position on this issue?Chantellenoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9532013.post-63778887951321340172011-07-13T11:57:34.323-04:002011-07-13T11:57:34.323-04:00The Cromer decision doesn't make much sense in...The Cromer decision doesn't make much sense in the opening the door context. Is the right of confrontation more fundamental than rights under the Fourth and Fifth amendments where the SC has allowed a defendant to open the door to such evidence? The Court has even held a defendant can open the door to statements taken in violation of his right to counsel. It seems as though Cromer is an anomoly on this front.Simonnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9532013.post-77007904294776749192011-07-01T09:14:51.945-04:002011-07-01T09:14:51.945-04:00I haven't thought about this much in a while. ...I haven't thought about this much in a while. Thanks for the question and for the cites. I'll try to look at the cases soon -- I'm on a quick vacation -- and offer something.Richard D. Friedmanhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/09512800093689534416noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9532013.post-86045425823037673712011-06-30T14:24:24.501-04:002011-06-30T14:24:24.501-04:00Professor,
I was wondering if you had any more su...Professor,<br /><br />I was wondering if you had any more substantive thoughts on whether a defendant can open the door to otherwise inadmissible evidence barred by the Confrontation Clause. The Tenth Circuit disagreed with the Cromer decision in US v Lopez-Medina, 596 F3d 716 (2010). <br />A peculiar decision was handed down recently in People v Reid, 82 AD3d 1495 (3d Dept 2011) and from what I've heard, the New York high court has granted leave on the issue. An interesting interplay between Bruton and Crawford and whether a defendant can open the door to such evidence. Do you have any thoughts on this decision?Chantellenoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9532013.post-1109972052020800862005-03-04T16:34:00.000-05:002005-03-04T16:34:00.000-05:00In talking about "opening the door" to excluded ev...In talking about "opening the door" to excluded evidence, one should not forget the line of Fourth Amendment and Miranda cases where otherwise admissible evidence previously excluded on constitutional grounds has been let in because the defendant "opened the door" to it. I'm thinking of Waldron, the dope case, and Havens, the case involving the t-shirt with the pockets cut out of it found in the dope trafficker's luggage. There is also Harris, where the defendant opened the door to his excluded un-Mirandized statement by contradicting it.<br /><br />Those cases stand for the proposition that constitutional protections cannot be turned into a shield for perjury. <br /><br />FredAnonymousnoreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9532013.post-1109955173231103512005-03-04T11:52:00.000-05:002005-03-04T11:52:00.000-05:00This comment has been removed by a blog administrator.Richard D. Friedmanhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08376534293308240526noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9532013.post-1107883757474538742005-02-08T12:29:00.000-05:002005-02-08T12:29:00.000-05:00I agree with Paul that this is a matter of the rul...I agree with Paul that this is a matter of the rule of completeness. I'm not sure that this is a full answer, though. Dale Nance has thoroughly analyzed the rule of completeness in a pair of articles, A Theory of Verbal Completeness, 80 Iowa L. Rev. 825 (1995), and Verbal Completeness and Exclusionary Rules Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, 75 Tex. L. Rev. 51 (1996). He shows that what he calls the "trumping" function -- that is, overcoming an otherwise valid evidentiary objection -- is the most important function of the rule, but it does not apply in every case. Sometimes the rule only means that the opponent can introduce the completing evidence now rather than later. So I think we still need to say something more than completeness to explain why the trumping function applies in this case.<br /><br />Paul also speaks of fairness. I always wonder what that means in the context of criminal procedure, which is asymmetric in various ways. I think I would rather say that in a case like Ko it would create intolerable distortion to allow him to present one part of the statement without the other.Richard D. Friedmanhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08376534293308240526noreply@blogger.com