The
Supreme Court decided Smith v. Arizona on Friday. On the whole, it was a very good
decision. The Court reversed
unanimously, with seven justices, all but the Chief Justice and Justice Alito,
signing on to the principal parts of Justice Kagan’s opinion for the majority. On the principal question presented, whether the
prosecution can avoid the Confrontation Clause on the ground that a statement
is offered in support of an expert opinion, even though the statement supports
the opinion only if it is true, that opinion was emphatic and clear: The answer
is no.
This post will analyze the
justices’ treatment of that question; I will later put up another post addressing
their treatment of another question that was not presented by the petition but
that gained a great deal of attention at argument, whether the statements in
question were testimonial. Throughout
this post I’ll assume that they were indeed testimonial (as I believe they
were).
(An aside: I say “principal question” because the
petition also raised the question of whether Smith’s failure to subpoena Rast
made any difference for Confrontation Clause analysis. The petition presented this question because
the Arizona appellate court noted that Smith “could have called [Rast] to the
stand and questioned her, but he chose not to do so.” But the Court devoted only one footnote to
this question because, as it noted, the state rightly did not defend this
rationale. Melendez-Diaz v.Massachusetts made clear that the defendant’s right to subpoena a witness
does not satisfy the confrontation right.)
Smith
was accused of drug-possession crimes.
To prove that the substances in question were illicit drugs, the
prosecution relied on the testimony of a lab analyst, Longoni. But Longoni did not do any testing himself;
instead, he based his opinion on statements made by another lab analyst,
Rast. For reasons that were never
explained, Rast was no longer employed by the lab at the time of trial, and the
state did not attempt to secure her live testimony. The state argued that, to the extent Rast’s
statements were presented to the jury, they were not presented for the truth of
matters they asserted, but rather in support of Longoni’s “independent”
opinion. The Arizona courts accepted
this argument, even though Rast’s statements would provide no support for
Longoni’s opinion unless they were true. But five justices had rejected that
theory in Williams v. Illinois; that did not fully resolve the matter,
though, because four of those five were in the minority, Justice Thomas joining
the other four in concluding (on different grounds from those four) that the lab
report there was not testimonial. So the
principal question on which the Smith Court granted cert was whether
that was a valid argument.
We can
assume that, strictly as a matter of modern rules of evidence, Longoni’s
testimony would be admissible, under FRE 703 or its state counterparts, or at
least would be given a proper foundation. (Arizona has a rule substantively
identical to FRE 703.) But, Justice
Kagan noted, “Evidentiary rules . . . do not control the inquiry into whether a
statement is admitted for its truth,” because that inquiry “marks the scope of
a federal constitutional right.” (Of
course, the same inquiry also is crucial in implementing hearsay law, but she
was focusing on the confrontation right.) And “federal constitutional rights
are not typically defined . . . by reference to non-constitutional bodies of
law like evidence rules.” The “not typically,” she explained in a footnote, was
to take into account one qualification: “If an evidentiary rule reflects a
long-established understanding, then it might shed light on the meaning of the
Confrontation Clause.” But that could not be so here, because Rule 703 “is a
product of the late 20th-century, and was understood from the start to
depart from past practice.” (This done with a citation to my amicus brief,
which only encourages me to keep on submitting them.)
So,
were Rast’s statements presented for their truth? Justice Kagan – properly, I think – found this
a very easy question:
If an expert for the prosecution
conveys an out-of-court statement in support of his opinion, and the statement
supports that opinion only if true, then the statement has been offered for the
truth of what it asserts. How could it be otherwise?
Put another way, she said, the truth of the basis testimony
(here Rast’s statements, the basis for Longoni’s opinions) is what makes it
useful to the prosecution, because “that is what supplies the predicate for –
and thus gives value to – the state expert’s opinion.” And looked at from another perspective, if
the jurors believe the basis evidence to be true, that will lead them to give more credit to the in-court expert’s opinion, and if they believe it false, it
will do the opposite. Thus – a critical
passage quoting Justice Thomas’s separate opinion in Williams – “'[t]here
is no meaningful distinction between disclosing an out-of-court statement’ to ‘explain
an expert’s opinion’ and ‘disclosing that statement for its truth.’” Whatever “label”
the state uses, “in all respects the two
purposes merge.”
The Court
then took some of the facts of the case as an “almost-too-perfect illustration”
of the general principles it had articulated. Longoni’s entire testimony was predicated
on Rast’s findings. If those findings were false, Longoni’s opinion “would have
counted for nothing.” Longoni was effectively “Rast’s mouthpiece.”
Further,
if the practice in this case were approved, it would “allow for easy evasion of
the Confrontation Clause,” making Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming v. New
Mexico “a dead letter”: “[E]very testimonial lab report could come into
evidence through any trained surrogate, however remote from the case.”
The
Court noted that its decision did not deny experts like Longoni any useful role
at trial. They could testify in general
about forensic guidelines and techniques.
If the expert worked in the particular lab, as Longoni did, they could
testify from personal knowledge about how that lab operates, including how it
maintains chains of custody. And the
expert could be asked hypothetical questions, as to what conclusions followed
assuming a given predicate. Justice
Alito jumped on this last possibility, as discussed below. I believe the Court’s catalog of
possibilities, which it did not contend was necessarily exclusive, was
completely accurate. But note – what
presumably set Justice Alito off – none of the possibilities appear to allow
the prosecution to prove lab results in a particular case without presenting
testimony subject to confrontation of an analyst who observed the key
case-specific facts. And that is as it
should be.
So that
was clear and straightforward and really excellent. I’ll raise one sort-of nit. The Court refers a couple of times (as it has
before) to “testimonial hearsay” as being at the core of the Confrontation
Clause. I wish the Court would avoid
that phrase, because it tends to minimize the separation between the
confrontation right and hearsay doctrine, and that separation was crucial to Crawford. (Justice Alito’s opinion says that the
majority opinion takes the view that “basis testimony is always hearsay,” and
that he would remand because Longoni’s testimony “is hearsay under any
mainstream conception.”) I understand the temptation – for there to be a
Confrontation Clause violation, there has to be a statement that was made out
of court and that is offered for the truth of a matter that it asserts, and
that’s the basic definition of hearsay. But
that just suggests that the two doctrines have an overlapping area of
concern. If there is a Confrontation
Clause violation, it is not because the statement would be deemed to be
hearsay – and if a statement avoids exclusion under the hearsay rule, that says
nothing about its standing under the Confrontation Clause.
And now
let’s consider Justice Alito’s opinion.
He begins by saying that “the Court inflicts a needless, unwarranted,
and crippling wound on modern evidence law.”
Wow! What is that wound? Well, at
considerable length he shows that the presentation of expert testimony in traditional
common law was largely dependent on hypothetical questions, and these created
significant problems. So along came Rule
703, and it “replaced” hypotheticals. And
now the Court has “disinterred that procedural monstrosity,” in an “assault on
modern evidence law.”
OK, let’s
first bear in mind that it’s just one rule, not all of modern evidence law that’s
affected. And it’s only the implementation
of that rule with respect to some
prosecution evidence that’s affected:
Evidence in civil trials, or evidence presented by a criminal defendant,
has nothing to do with this case, and even with respect to prosecution evidence
this decision will have no effect at all if the statement at issue is not
testimonial. (Think of a routine blood test taken without any indication that
it is for evidentiary purposes, perhaps even before the crime is committed. And also note that if the in-court expert’s
opinion doesn’t depend on the truth of the statement, neither Rule 703 nor the
Confrontation Clause comes into play.) And Rule 703 did not do away with
hypotheticals; indeed, the Advisory Committee Note explicitly refers to
hypothetical as continuing to be one way of presenting expert evidence. Putting aside the Confrontation Clause for
the moment, it did not even do away in all circumstances with the need to ask a hypothetical question,
because the predicate for operation of Rule 703, that experts in the field
would rely on the particular type of facts or data in forming an opinion on the
subject, will not always be satisfied.
(Note also the Advisory Committee Note to Rule 705, which says that the
instances in which counsel is required to make prior disclosure of the facts or
data underlying an opinion “are reduced.”
What Smith holds is that if (1) a prosecutor
seeks to introduce an in-court witness’s opinion, and (2) that witness did not
observe the facts supporting the opinion, and (3) the factual basis supporting
the opinion is contained in an out-of-court testimonial statement, and (4) that
statement supports the opinion only if it is true, and (5) the in-court witness
testifies to the substance of that statement but (6) the author of the
statement does not testify in court, then there is a Confrontation Clause
violation (absent forfeiture, we might add).
That is hardly an assault on modern evidence law. Nor does it constitute a “trashing” of Rule
703, as Justice Alito suggested at oral argument. Now, it is true that if there were no
Confrontation Clause, Rule 703 would presumably allow the evidence even in this
situation. But so what? Rule 703 is not only a latter-day creation;
it was written at a time when there was no clear conception of what the
Confrontation Clause meant, so it is not surprising that it did not take the
Clause into account. And as the Court
indicates, and Justice Alito does not deny, the Constitution trumps evidentiary
rules, not the other way around.
But then,
eager though Justice Alito is to protect application of Rule 703, how did he
get around the Confrontation Clause? Well,
he says, under Rule 703, the evidence is admissible only to support the
opinion, and on request the trial judge must instruct the jury to consider it only
for that purpose, not for the truth. So
there’s no Confrontation Clause violation; we presume jurors will follow
instructions.
The
problem, which he ignores altogether, is that such an instruction makes no
sense at all, for a reason indicated by the majority’s quotation from Justice Thomas’s
Williams opinion – if the statement supports the opinion only if true, there is “no
meaningful distinction” between admitting the statement for its truth and
admitting it in support of the opinion. (Justice Alito overstates
the case when he says that “the Court seems to think that all basis testimony is necessarily offered for its truth.”) This is not a matter of distrusting the jury;
it’s a matter of simple logic. If we
instructed the jurors to stand with both feet on the ground while one foot is
in the air, it would not be incompetence of the jurors that would prevent them
from complying.
But
after all that, Justice Alito still concluded that the trial court erred. He equates the requirements of the Confrontation
Clause in this area (apart from the question of whether the statement in question
is testimonial) with those of the Federal Rules of Evidence – a false conjunction,
as I have indicated – and says that Longoni could have disclosed the
information in Rast’s statements, if, under Rule 703, the court found that the
probative value of that information substantially outweighed its prejudicial potential.
“But,” he then said,
he could not testify that any of
the information in the report was correct—for instance, that Rast actually
performed the tests she recorded or that she did so correctly. Nor could he
testify that the items she tested were the ones seized from Smith. Longoni did
not have personal knowledge of any of these facts, and it is unclear what
“reliable” scientific “methods” could lead him to intuit their truth from
Rast’s records. Fed. Rule Evid. 702(c) (defining a permissible expert opinion).
And in this case, Justice Alito says, he agrees with the
Court that Longoni “stepped over the line and at times testified to the truth
of the matter asserted,” because at times he asserted as true various
assertions made by Rast, such as the methods as procedures she followed, the tests
she performed, and the results she got.
Wow again. First, let’s not slide over what strikes me
as a rather large irony. I have always thought
– and I hope readers will correct me if they think I’m wrong – that given certain findings (that the in-court expert is making the type of reasonable reliance
on an outside statement that experts in the field make, and that the
probative value of the statement outweighs the prejudicial effect) Rule 703 does in fact
allow the in-court witness to testify to the truth of that statement, the
hearsay rule notwithstanding. That is
why the Rule says that if the reasonable-reliance predicate is satisfied, the
underlying facts or data “need not be admissible,” and why Rule 703 is
sometimes thought of as an extra hearsay exception. I suppose one could say that the witness
would be allowed to testify, “I relied on this statement, but I’m not saying it
is true.” But what sense does that
make? Unless it’s believed to be true,
it provides no support for the opinion.
So is that the type of testimony Justice Alito wants experts to give
under Rule 703? And if so, who is
undercutting the usefulness of that Rule, not only when prosecutors attempt to
use it to get in testimonial evidence, but across the board?
Second, how far apart in the end is
Justice Alito from the majority? He says that Longoni’s testimony was improper, because in trying to support his
opinion he really was testifying to the truth of statements made by the absent
Rast. Gee, sounds a fair amount like the
majority. So I wonder just what is it he
thinks Longoni should have been able to do that the majority doesn’t? Perhaps readers can enlighten me.
A related question: What if, as Rules 703 and 705 allow, Longoni
just testifies to an opinion, without disclosing the underlying statements. Would the Confrontation Clause tolerate that? I think it’s clear that under Rules 703 and
705 the defense should be allowed to ask what the basis for the testimony is – and
that as soon as the witness discloses the basis we are back in the same
position.
In the end, I wonder to what extent
Justice Alito and for that matter the Chief Justice too, were motivated by
the fact that they appear to have lost this part of the battle. They were part of a foursome in Melendez-Diaz, Bullcoming,
and Williams, and by picking up
Justice Thomas’s vote in Williams
they were able to get the result they wanted.
But four members of the Court have since left, two from the Melendez-Diaz majority and two from the
minority, and all four junior justices joined the Smith majority (on the Melendez-Diaz
majority side, Justice Gorsuch for Justice Scalia and Justice Barrett
for Justice Ginsburg, and on the minority side Justice Kavanaugh for Justice
Kennedy and Justice Jackson for Justice Breyer). So Justice Alito can snarl all he wants, but
on this issue at least he now speaks for only two justices.