The coronavirus crisis has created increased interest in the subject of remote testimony – testimony in which the witness is not in the courtroom but rather testifies from a remote location, with the testimony electronically transmitted to the courtroom. I hope courts will not use the crisis as an occasion for undermining the confrontation right, even temporarily – especially because, as I will explain, there is a rather simple solution in this setting.
I wrote at length some years ago about remote testimony in a law review article. And, as it happens, in early March (while courts were still holding ordinary sessions) I participated, as amicus, in an argument on the subject in the Michigan Supreme Court in People v. Jemison. You can see the main briefs of the parties, and my amicus brief, here. (The video of the argument is available here.) My amicus brief lays out my general views on the subject.
In sum, though Maryland v. Craig allowed remote testimony by children in cases of demonstrated trauma, Craig is in tension with Crawford, which was decided afterwards, and should not be extended, especially by lower courts. The Supreme Court declined to transmit to Congress a proposed amendment to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure that would have allowed for remote testimony in some cases; Justice Scalia, writing in support of that decision, explained that “virtual confrontation” did not appear to satisfy the confrontation right. I don’t believe there is any need to take an absolute stand that virtual confrontation will never be deemed acceptable for adult witnesses. But at this point I don’t believe that we are close to having enough scientific knowledge to be confident that virtual confrontation is an adequate substitute for taking testimony the traditional way. And if it is to be allowed, it should only be in cases of compelling need (Jemison does not come close), and only under a careful protocol that ensures satisfactory technical specifications and also proper procedures with respect to such matters as how much may be seen and who may be in the room with the witness.
Now, how about the current crisis? Here, the impetus for remote testimony is not to protect the witness from trauma (as under Craig), or to save time and money, or that for some reason, such as a witness who is desperately ill or beyond the subpoena power, it appears difficult or unfeasible to bring the witness to the courtroom. Rather, here the consideration is the necessity of keeping people a sufficient distance apart. But to satisfy the confrontation right, it is not necessary that the witness be in a full courtroom. All that is required is that the witness, the defendant, and defense counsel be in the same room when the witness testifies; presumably the prosecutor would want to be as well. Perhaps a videographer would be as well, though that might not be necessary. And it would not be necessary that the judge be in the room; a remote hookup should suffice, and in fact even that would not be absolutely essential. It has long been established that when the witness cannot be brought to the courtroom, a deposition, at which the accused has had an opportunity for confrontation, is sufficient, and Crawford maintains this rule. Getting the witness to the defendant, or the defendant and counsel to the witness, does involve some transportation, but most witnesses in criminal cases do not live far from defendants, and this should not be a major consideration, even under current conditions, though one could imagine that in an occasional case it might make sense to postpone the trial for a few months.
In most jurisdictions, depositions in a criminal case are relatively rare. But this is an occasion on which they ought to be held routinely.
